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In four closely-related decisions in 1995,1 the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that anonymous juries do not inherently
violate a defendant's fundamental right to an impartial jury or
erode the presumption of innocence Additionally, the court
provided guidelines for the trial courts to follow to ensure that
criminal defendants' constitutional rights are not violated.'
Consequently, anonymous juries are not an inherently prejudi-
cial practice.
In the first case, State v. Bowles, the Minnesota Supreme
Court articulated a two-part rule for lower courts to follow when
impaneling an anonymous jury.4 A court impaneling an
anonymous jury must: 1) have a strong reason to believe that
jurors need protection from external threats; and 2) take
reasonable precautions to minimize any prejudicial effect the
jurors' anonymity may have on the defendant's presumption of
innocence.5
Shannon Bowles, a "footsoldier" of the Vice Lords street
1. State v. Bowles, 530 N.W.2d 521 (Minn. 1995); State v. McKenzie, 532 N.W.2d
210 (Minn. 1995); State v. Flournoy, 535 N.W.2d 354 (Minn. 1995); State v. Ford, 539
N.W.2d 214 (Minn. 1995). All four defendants in these cases were members of the
Vice Lords street gang. Three of the defendants were involved in the murder of police
officer Jerry Haaf. The fourth defendant was involved in the murder of another Vice
Lord member, Ed Harris. This review focuses on the Bowles and McKenzie decisions.
For a more thorough analysis of the Bowles decision, see Jodene Jensen, Case Note,
Constitutional Law: Minnesota's First Anonymous Jury-State v. Bowles, 530 N. W 2d 521
(Minn. 1995), 22 WM. MrrCHELL L. REv. 133 (1996) (in this issue).
2. Bowles, 530 N.W.2d at 530.
3. Id. at 530-31.
4. Bowles was the first of the four cases heard by the Minnesota Supreme Court
on the use of an anonymous jury. However, it was the second case tried in the lower
court, being preceded by State v. Ford, 539 N.W.2d 214 (Minn. 1995). In Ford, the
defendant argued that the district court violated rule 26.02(2) of the Minnesota Rules
of Criminal Procedure which states that upon request the clerk shall furnish the parties
with a list of names and addresses of the persons on the jury panel. However, Jury
Management Rule 814(b) allows the court to restrict the addresses of the prospective
jurors. Noting that the two rules are inconsistent, the Ford court requested the Advisory
Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure to propose a change to the rules to make
them consistent. Ford, 539 N.W.2d at 223.
5. Bowles, 530 N.W.2d at 530-31.
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gang,6 was convicted of killing Officer Jerry Haaf, a uniformed
police officer.7 Officer Haaf was shot in the back four times by
Bowles and another member of the Vice Lords, Mwati Mc-
Kenzie,' while he was having coffee in the Pizza Shack restau-
rant in Minneapolis.9 The shooting was planned and carried
out by the Vice Lords "in retaliation for the alleged beating of
a blind, elderly black man by the Metropolitan Transit Commis-
sion police.""° Immediately after the shooting incident, Bowles
and McKenzie went to the home of Ed Harris, another Vice
Lord member, to change their clothes, dispose of their guns and
wash their hands. 1 Two weeks after the murder of Officer
Haaf, Ed Harris was found shot to death in an alley in south
Minneapolis. 2 The police department's theory was that the
Vice Lords killed Ed Harris because they believed Harris was
passing information to the police about the Haaf murder.
3
On motion from the state, the trial court impaneled an
anonymous jury.1" The trial court determined, over Bowles's
objections, that an anonymousjury was necessary because of the
"exceptional circumstances peculiar to this case." 5 The trial
judge was referring to the retaliatory nature of both the killing
of Mr. Harris and the killing of Officer Haaf. 6 However,
during voir dire the judge explained to the jury the reason for
anonymity was potential harassment by members of the me-
6. See Ford, 539 N.W.2d at 217 (noting specifically that Bowles and McKenzie, who
carried out the shooting were "footsoldiers," the lowest rank of the Vice Lords, in
contrast with Ford, who was second in command).
7. Bowles, 530 N.W.2d at 525.
8. See State v. McKenzie, 532 N.W.2d 210 (Minn. 1995) (finding defendant
McKenzie guilty of first-degree murder of Officer Haaf).




13. Id. Another member of the Vice Lords was convicted for the murder of Ed
Harris. See State v. Flournoy, 535 N.W.2d 354, 356 (Minn. 1995).
14. Bowles, 530 N.W.2d at 528.
15. Id. The court further stated that, "those exceptions and circumstances involve
the... violence associated with what occurred or is alleged to have occurred after the
killing of Officer Haaf, specifically the violence associated with Mr. Harris." Id. at 526.
16. Id. at 531. Haaf was killed in retaliation for the beating of an elderly blind
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dia. 7 At Bowles's request, the jury was not given a special
instruction on the presumption of innocence at the close of
trial." On appeal, Bowles argued that an anonymous jury
destroyed his presumption of innocence, and consequently he
was denied his fundamental right to a trial by an impartial
jury.'9 The Minnesota Supreme Court determined that if the
trial court follows certain precautions when impaneling an
anonymous jury, it presents "little risk of actual prejudice to a
defendant." °
The Bowles court supplied a two-part test2' to be the
analytical framework used by the lower courts when impaneling
an anonymous jury. First, the trial court must have "strong
reasons" to believe that the jurors need protection.2 The
second element is the need to protect the defendant's constitu-
tional right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.2" The "strong
reasons" prong of the test may be satisfied if the trial court
believes that the jury needs protection from outside threats, such
as organized crime and gang-related violence.24 Further, for
highly-publicized cases, the trial court may feel the jurors need
17. Id. After voir dire the court instructed the impaneled jurors that they will only
be addressed by juror number to maintain anonymity. Id. at 529.
18. Id. at 529. The state proposed the following instruction to be added to the
standardjury instruction: "You are further instructed that the fact that the jury selection
process which has been conducted anonymously cannot be considered by you as in any
way suggesting guilt." Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 531.
21. Id. at 530. The two-part rule was first developed by federal courts in cases
involving Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) prosecutions of
organized crime figures. Id. The court cited United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183
(2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 1220 (1992), in which the defendant was a member
of the Gambino family. In this highly-publicized trial, many of the government's
witnesses received threats. Paccione, 949 F.2d at 1192-93. Similarly, in United States v.
Crockett, 979 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 998 (1993), the
defendants, members of violent criminal organizations, attempted to intimidate
witnesses in a case with extensive pretrial publicity. Crockett, 979 F.2d at 1216. In
United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1363 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 819
(1986), and cert. denied, 479 U.S. 818 (1986), the defendants were members of an
organized criminal group charged with murdering government witnesses. Thomas, 757
F.2d at 1362, 1364.
22. Bowes, 530 N.W.2d at 530.
23. Id. at 529-30.
24. Id. at 531. In Bowle, the murder of Ed Harris by the Vice Lords because he was
thought to be a government informant, coupled with the retaliatory nature of the Haaf
murder, may lead jurors to conclude that they or their families would be vulnerable to
harassment or retaliation from other members of the Vice Lords. Id.
1996]
3
Pagonis: A Survey of Important Decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court: 1
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1996
VWLLL4M M/TChELL LAW REVEW
protection from media harassment. 25 The second prong of the
test requires the trial court to take "reasonable precautions to
minimize any prejudicial effect thejurors' anonymity might have
on the defendant."26  This part of the test may be satisfied
through "extensive voir dire to expose juror bias"27 and instruc-
tions designed to eliminate any implication of the defendant's
guilt.2 '8 By following the guidelines provided in Bowles, the
court held that an anonymous jury would be properly impan-
eled, and therefore, not inherently prejudicial. 9
The court explicitly stated that the trial court need not
make a written finding on the jury's need for protection.30
However, the court did instruct the lower courts to keep a clear
and detailed record explaining the facts underlying the determi-
nation, showing "strong reason to believe the jury needs
protection from external threats.""1 The trial court may explain
to the jurors the reason for anonymity, but "should not unneces-
sarily burden the defendant's presumption of innocence. "12
Lastly, the Bowles court noted "[t]he decision to impanel an
anonymous jury must take place 'in the light of reason, principle
and common sense."' 33
In State v. McKenzie, Mwati McKenzie was also convicted of
the first-degree murder of Officer Haaf."4 McKenzie, another
"footsoldier" in the Vice Lords, went to the Pizza Shack along
with Shannon Bowles, and shot Officer Haaf.35 McKenzie went
to the home of Ed Harris after the shooting to change his
25. Id. at 531 n.15. The court took judicial notice of a highly publicized case in
which the jury acquitted the defendant of the sexual assault and murder of a four-year-
old child. In that case, the jurors experienced harassment from the media and the
public after the acquittal. Id.
26. Id. at 531.
27. Id. In Bowles, both the defendant and the prosecution engaged in extensive
voir dire to determine the jurors' ability to be impartial, their belief in the presumption
of innocence and the effect of their anonymity. Id.
28. Id.; see also State v. McKenzie, 532 N.W.2d 210, 220 (1995).
29. Bowles, 530 N.W.2d at 529-30. The court distinguished courtroom practices
that would be inherently prejudicial, for example shackles and gags, which may have
a significant effect on the jury's feelings about the defendant. Id. at 529 n.14.
30. Id. at 531.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. (quoting United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1363 (2d Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 819, (1986), and cert. denied, 479 U.S. 818 (1986)).
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clothes and hide the guns."8 Again, the trial court authorized
the use of an anonymous jury over objections by the defense. 7
In a preliminary instruction to the entire jury pool, the trial
court stated the reasons for anonymity, focusing on outside
influence.38 Before voir dire, the trial court read an instruction
to each individual potential juror on the reasons for anonymity
focusing on publicity and the curious public.3 9 Further, the
trial court expressed concern that the jurors' attention could be
diverted from the evidence in the case. 4
McKenzie challenged the use of an anonymous jury, arguing
that impaneling an anonymous jury destroyed the presumption
of innocence and consequently denied him the fundamental
right to a trial by an impartial jury.41 McKenzie further argued
that the trial court's instruction failed to limit the prejudicial
impact but actually exacerbated the problem.42 Although the
court urged future trial courts to provide greater detail for the
basis of its decision to impanel an anonymous jury, the McKenzie
court concluded that the trial court met the first prong of the
test: "strong reason .. . in the light of reason, principle and
common sense."43 Specifically, the first prong was satisfied for
several reasons: 1) the two preceding trials" concerning the
36. Id. at 213-14.
37. Id. at 215.
38. Id. The explanation was prepared by defense counsel and included the
following-
[T] he reason for this is to make sure that you are not bothered by
anyone, whether it's the media or anyone else with an interest in this
case, trying to have any kind of influence on you. We are proceeding
in this way to make absolutely sure that each juror who decides the
case does so solely on the evidence produced in court and under the
rules of law and evidence as they will be applied.
Id. at 215-16.
39. Id. at 216.
40. Id. The trial court stated to each juror:
The Court does not wish to allow such outside influences to divert
the jury's attention from the evidence or to cause people to pry into
the personal affairs of the jurors . ... Anonymity will ward off
curiosity that might infringe on ajuror's privacy and will insulate the
jury from improper influence that might interfere with its sworn duty
to judge the evidence fairly.
Id.
41. Id. at 219.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 220.
44. McKenzie was preceded in the trial court by State v. Ford, 539 N.W.2d 214
(Minn. 1995) and State v. Bowles, 530 N.W.2d 521 (Minn. 1995).
1996]
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murder of Officer Haaf impaneled anonymous juries;45 2)
although there was no indication of outside influence, the trial
court was concerned about influence by the media and outside
demonstrators;' and 3) the retaliatory nature of the murder of
Ed Harris provided a legitimate supporting basis for the court's
decision. 7
In examining the second prong of the test, the supreme
court found that the trial court took reasonable precautions to
minimize the impact on the presumption of innocence.' Also,
the supreme court further refined the second prong of the test
requiring "1) extensive voir dire of the jurors to expose bias; and
2) instructions from the trial court designed to eliminate any
implication as to the defendant's guilt."49 The court provided
a preliminary instruction to the entire jury pool on the need for
anonymity, as well as an instruction to each potential juror
before voir dire began.5" Secondly, during voir dire the ques-
tioning was directed to the issue of anonymity and a determina-
tion that the jury understood that the basis for the anonymous
jury was "a concern about outside influence from the media or
others."5 Lastly, the jury was instructed on the defendant's
presumption of innocence and the state's burden to prove the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.52  Based on
satisfying both prongs, the court concluded that the decision to
impanel an anonymousjury did not violate the defendant's right
to trial by an impartial jury.5"
B. Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations
After numerous attempts to encourage law enforcement
officials to tape record custodial interrogations,54 the Minnesota
45. McKmzie 532 N.W.2d at 219.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 219-20.
48. Id. at 220.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. The extensive voir dire included a 20-page written questionnaire and
questions regarding the juror's ability to judge impartially.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 591 (Minn. 1994). The court cited previous
cases in which disputes could have been avoided if the custodial interrogation had been
taped. Specifically, in State v. Robinson, 427 N.W.2d 217 (Minn. 1988), the court found
that disputes about the denial of a defendant's constitutional rights would be avoided
[Vol. 22
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Supreme Court in State v. Scales exercised its supervisory power
by requiring the tape recording of all custodial interrogations
that occur at a place of detention, and where feasible, at any
point in the interrogation where information is provided about
rights or waivers of those rights, or where any questioning
occurs.
55
Michael Scales was convicted of brutally killing Otha Brown,
the mother of his girlfriend Angela Walker, and the grandmoth-
er of his two-year-old son.56 At 1:00 A.M. on October 4, 1992,
Scales woke Ms. Brown and asked for a ride to the hospital,
claiming he was sick. 7 At 7:00 A.M. Ms. Brown's body was
discovered with twenty-six stab wounds. 8 Scales was taken into
custody at about 7:00 P.M. that evening.5" Law enforcement
officials questioned Scales for about three hours without
recording the session.' Then officials conducted a formal
question-and-answer statement that was simultaneously tran-
scribed.6  At the subsequent Rasmussen hearing,62  Scales
disputed much of the content of the interview, including the
Miranda warnings,6" waiver of his rights, information about
fingerprints on the weapon, and whether he actually made the
statements attributed to him. ' On appeal to the Minnesota
Supreme Court, Scales argued that his due process rights under
the Minnesota Constitution were violated when his entire
if the conversations between the police and the suspect were recorded. Robinson, 427
N.W.2d at 591. In State v. Pilcher, 472 N.W.2d 327 (Minn. 1991), the court urged "law
enforcement professionals to use those technological means at their disposal to fully
preserve those conversations and events preceding the actual interrogation" and further
warned that the court would "look with great disfavor upon any further refusal to heed
these admonitions." Pi/cher, 472 N.W.2d at 333. The court also stated "We are
disturbed by the fact that law enforcement officials have ignored our warnings in Pilcher
and Robinson." Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 592.
55. Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 591.
56. Id. at 589.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 587.
59. Id. at 590.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. A Rasmussen hearing is a pre-trial hearing to determine the admissibility
of evidence obtained by the police. See State v. Tahash, 272 Minn. 539, 141 N.W.2d 3
(1966).
63. Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 590. A Miranda warning requires law enforcement
officials to advise an individual in custody of his constitutional rights in clear and
unequivocal language. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
64. Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 590.
1996]
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interrogation by law enforcement officials was not recorded
electronically.' Scales further claimed that by failing to
preserve the entire interrogation the police ignored the warnings
of the Minnesota Supreme Court.66
The court agreed 7 that the recording of custodial interro-
gations "is now a reasonable and necessary safeguard, essential
to the adequate protection of the accused's right to counsel, his
right against self incrimination and, ultimately, his right to a fair
trial."' A recording provides a more accurate record of a
defendant's interrogation and so reduces the number of disputes
over law enforcement official's handling of the custodial
interrogation, with respect to the defendant's rights. 69 Also, a
recording serves to protect the state against meritless claims.7"
Furthermore, a recording requirement will discourage unfair and
psychologically coercive police tactics, resulting in more profes-
sional law enforcement.
71
The Minnesota Supreme Court exercised its supervisory
power to "insure the fair administration of justice"72 by holding
that all custodial interrogation, including any information about
rights, any waiver of those rights, and all questioning, shall be
electronically recorded where feasible and must be recorded
when questioning occurs at a place of detention." If law
enforcement officials fail to comply with the recording require-
ment, then the interrogation may be suppressed at trial. 74 The
65. Id. at 589.
66. Id. at 591. The defendant relied on a holding from an Alaska case, Stephan
v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985), in which the unexcused failure to electronically
record a custodial interrogation violated a suspect's right to due process under the
Alaska Constitution. Stephan, 711 P.2d at 1158.
67. Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 592. Even though the court agreed with the defendant
on the need to record custodial interrogations, the court nevertheless affirmed the trial
court's conviction of Scales. Id.
68. Id. (citing Stephan, 711 P.2d at 1160).
69. Id. at 591 (citing Stephan, 711 P.2d at 1160-62).
70. Id.
71. Id. The court noted that Uniform Rule of Criminal Procedure 243 (1974)
provides that information about rights, any waiver and all questioning shall be recorded
where feasible, and must be recorded when the questioning occurs at a place of
detention. The court also noted that section 130.4(3) of the Model Code of Pre-
Arraignment Procedure (1975) also contains a recording requirement.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 592.
74. Id. The exclusionary rule will be decided on a case by case basis, but
suppression will be required if the violation is deemed "substantial." Substantiality is
[Vol. 22
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court held this rule will apply prospectively from the time of the
filing of the Scales decision.75
This decision broadens a defendant's rights beyond the
requirement of due process in the federal Constitution.
76
However, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that it has power
to provide broader individual rights under the Minnesota
Constitution than are permitted under the U.S. Constitution.77
In her dissent, Justice Tomljanovich argued that the Minnesota
decision goes beyond what is required under the due process
requirements of the U.S. Constitution, 7 and that suppressing
the statement was a drastic remedy for a failure to record the
custodial interrogation.79 Justice Tomjanovich suggested the
exclusionary rule should only apply after a full hearing of the
policy implications and adequate notice to law enforcement
officials.80
In a later case, State v. Thagaard,8 ' the court further ex-
plained the requirement to record custodial interrogations is not
to help criminal defendants or to help the state. 2 "Rather the
primary purpose is to assist the trial court in the resolution of
evidentiary disputes and in more accurately determining the
underlying facts."" Recordings will also aid the appellate
review of rulings on motions to suppress confessions.8 4
Stella Pagonis
to be determined by the trial court using Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure
section 150.3(2) and (3). If the trial court finds the violation substantial, the reasons
for the finding must be placed on the record. Id.
75. Id. at 593. The Scales decision was filed on June 30, 1994. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. (citing State v. Murphy, 380 N.W.2d 766, 770 (Minn. 1986)).
78. Id. at 593-94. (Tomljanovich, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 594.
80. Id. Justice Tomljanovich noted, "This is particularly true where a right is not
found to be rooted in the state constitution." Id.
81. 527 N.W.2d 804 (Minn. 1995). In Thagaard, the defendant was subjected to an
unrecorded "preinterview" interview, at which, the defendant claimed, the law
enforcement official promised a referral into drug treatment if the defendant would
"tell him up front what happened." The defendant subsequently confessed, but moved
to suppress the confession on the basis that he was tricked into confessing. If Sca/es
applied and the entire interrogation was recorded, then the issues of deception and
trickery on the part law enforcement officials would not be a question. Id. at 807.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 807-08.
84. Id. at 808.
1996]
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